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Summary 
Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain 
because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology 
spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and 
stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) 
that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology 
spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and 
reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 
stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by 
simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good 
instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong 
free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust 
against the specification of technology spillovers. 
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1. Introduction 
Successful CO2 emission abatement requires international cooperation. However, full 
cooperation in the international environmental agreements (IEAs) seems to be difficult to 
achieve because of free-riding incentives. Game theoretic approaches are widely used to 
explore the properties of IEAs (e.g., Barrett, 1994) and the effects of institutional settings 
aimed to stimulate voluntary participation in the IEAs,  for example through transfers (e.g., 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Hoel and Schneider, 1997; and Weikard et al., 2006). A general 
observation from this literature is that rather small partial coalitions tend to emerge and the 
coalition with all members may not be attained. For example, Barrett (1994) proves that stable 
coalitions will be small if the difference between the non-cooperative outcome and the full-
cooperative outcome for each region is large. Hoel and Schneider (1997) conclude that letting 
non-signatories reduce their emissions by means of transfers from signatories will not 
increase the number of signatories, which implies higher global emissions in the case of 
transfers than in the case of no transfer. Thus, even with transfers, full cooperation on 
emission abatement is hard to get established.  
To improve these outcomes, a number of studies have proposed to link the agreements on 
emissions abatement to other economic issues, especially to technological cooperation. The 
main idea of this mechanism is that each region negotiates not only on emissions abatement 
but also negotiates on technological cooperation, which might induce regions to join a 
coalition. For example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1994) indicate that linkage of the IEAs on 
climate control and technological cooperation may stabilise an IEA, as payoffs of signatories 
will increase due to increased technological spillovers from other signatories. Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1997) show that linkage of the environmental agreement with an agreement on 
technological cooperation may overcome free-riding problems due to the fact that the 
negotiation on both climate control and technology is more profitable to signatories when 
benefits from technological cooperation are exclusive to them than the negotiation on climate 
control only. Kemfert (2004) shows in an applied coalition formation game with four regions 
that signatories can profit more when they cooperate on emissions abatement and 
technological innovation than in the case of non-cooperation. Furthermore, there exist 
incentives for non-cooperating countries, such as the U.S.A., to join an agreement in which 
countries cooperate both on emissions abatement and technological innovations, because they 
can obtain technology spillovers, which improve energy efficiency through trade with 
signatories. 
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Buonanno et al. (2003) define the international spillovers of knowledge generated by a stock 
of world knowledge. In their setting, international knowledge spillovers affect both the 
production function and the emission to output ratio. Golombek and Hoel (2005) assume that 
the technology level of the region depends on own investments in R&D and R&D investment 
in other countries (signatories) using a certain rate of technology diffusion, and R&D 
activities in cooperating countries will lower abatement costs in non-cooperating countries 
due to technology diffusion. The general insight that emerges from these studies is that there 
are a number of different channels through which technology spillovers may affect the 
payoffs of regions and thus the incentives to cooperate: (i) global spillovers from a “world 
stock of knowledge”, (ii) spillovers that are directly derived from participation in the 
agreement (coalitional spillovers), and (iii) spillovers to outsiders. What all these studies lack, 
however, is a systematic analysis of the influence of technology spillovers on the stability of 
international climate agreements with heterogeneous players in an applied setting. 
Technology spillovers can be (and are) specified in many different ways, depending on the 
answer to the essential questions such as how to measure technology and how to specify 
spillovers. Most existing models assume that the level of environmental technology can be 
approximated by looking at the emission intensity of production, that knowledge can be 
aggregated over regions through summation, and that spillovers have the effect of pivoting the 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve down. Recent literature suggests, however, that a 
‘best-shot’ aggregation of technology may be more appropriate (Sandler, 2006). Furthermore, 
alternative indicators of technology, such as based on energy intensity or carbon intensity, are 
also found in the applied literature (e.g. Kemfert, 2004). Finally, Baker et al. (2007) and 
Bauman et al. (2007) challenge the conventional specification that spillovers (or learning, for 
that matter) pivot down the MAC curves. Baker et al. (2007) suggest two alternatives: an 
extension of the MAC curve to the right, and a change in the curvature of the MAC curve. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how these various technology spillover 
mechanisms and specifications affect the formation and stability of climate coalitions in a 
non-cooperative game. To do this, we use an integrated assessment model, STACO (Finus et 
al., 2006; Nagashima et al., 2006). We explore the links between coalition formation and 
technology spillovers from both sides by investigating how technology spillovers that depend 
on the coalition that is formed influence the incentive structures to join the coalition. 
Moreover, we will examine whether the effects of technology spillovers are large enough to 
stabilise more ambitious coalitions by offsetting the incentive to free-ride. We simulate 
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several spillover mechanisms and specifications that are available in the literature, to 
investigate the robustness of these links. To keep the analysis tractable, we leave the issues of 
a separate technology agreement and endogenous learning effects for further analysis; thus, 
the spillovers we investigate are all specified as externalities, and there are no endogenous 
feedback effects from abatement on the state of technology. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the game theoretic and empirical 
framework of the STACO model, and introduces technology spillovers in the model. Section 
3 reports the main results with technology spillovers, followed by the analysis of alternative 
specifications of technology in the Section 4. Section 5 provides sensitivity analysis, and 
Section 6 concludes. The Appendix provides the model parameter values.  
2. The stability of coalitions model (STACO) 
2.1. Game theoretic background 
In this section, we describe the game theoretic model following Finus et al. (2006) and 
Nagashima et al. (2006). Our analysis uses a two stage game. In the first stage, regions 
denoted by Ni ∈ , { }nN ,...,1=  decide whether they sign the agreement or not. Signatories form 
a coalition and non-signatories remain singletons in the second stage of the game. Then, all 
regions simultaneously determine their emission abatement levels, The payoff for each region 
ipi  is a function of regional benefits itB  and regional abatement costs itAC  at period t . 
Formally, we have: 
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where q  is an abatement matrix of dimension N × ∞  and r is the discount rate. The payoff 
is calculated as the net present value of the stream of net benefits. We assume that the 
regional benefits depend on past and current global emission abatement, and the regional 
abatement costs depend on a region’s own current abatement. The regional abatement levels 
is determined within the abatement strategy space [ ]itit eq ,0∈ , where ite  denotes emission 
levels in the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.  
We apply the solution concept of a partial agreement Nash equilibrium between the 
signatories and singletons (Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997). We assume that signatories 
determine their abatement level by maximising the sum of the payoffs of the signatories 
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taking the abatement levels of non-signatories as given. Non-signatories choose their 
abatement level by maximising their own payoffs taking the other regions’ abatement levels 
as given. This abatement game has a unique interior solution under the STACO specification 
of benefit and cost functions (see Section 2.2). Moreover, an emission permit trading system 
is applied among signatories. We define a valuation function )(KVi  which yields regional 
payoffs with permit trading given coalition K . The payoff for signatory i after permit trading 
is defined as follows: 
 
* *( ( )) ( ( ) ( ))it it it t it itV (K) q K p q K q Kpi≡ − ⋅ −  , (2) 
where tp  is the permit price in period t , *itq  is the optimal abatement in coalition K  and itq~  is 
the assigned abatement under the permit trading system. The assigned abatement level is 
determined as the difference between regional BAU emissions and regional emission permits, 
which are distributed proportional to the regional emission paths (Nagashima et al., 2006). 
We refer to the situations where none or one of the regions joins a coalition as ‘All 
Singletons’, and a coalition where all regions cooperate as ‘Grand Coalition’.  
We call a coalition K stable if the coalition satisfies both internal and external stability. 
Internal stability of a coalition means that no signatory has an incentive to withdraw from the 
coalition. For external stability, we consider a unanimity voting system in which signatories 
vote on entry of singletons (cf. Bloch, 1997; Finus et al., 2005). This definition of external 
stability has two interpretations. First, none of the singletons has an incentive to join the 
coalition if they are worse off when they are joining. Second, if one has an incentive to join 
the coalition they are, however, not allowed to enter the coalition if at least one of the 
signatories becomes worse off. 
Formally, the stability concepts are defined as: 
Internal stability: 
{})\()( iKVKV ii ≥  Ki ∈∀ , (3) 
External stability:  
If  { })()( jKVKV jj ∪≥ Kj ∉∀ , or         (4a) 
if  { })()( jKVKV jj ∪<  Kj ∉∃  and then { })()( jKVKV ii ∪>  if 0>k , { } Kki ∈= ,...,1 .   (4b) 
Finus and Rundshagen (2003) suggest that exclusive membership may stabilise climate 
coalitions because coalition members can control the entry of non-signatories which may 
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obstruct the existing internally stable coalition. If at least one of the regions outside the 
coalition is allowed to enter the coalition, the coalition is no more externally stable. Hence, 
once an internally stable coalition is attained, the entry of new members does not hamper the 
interest of forming a coalition for existing coalition members under the exclusive 
membership. Different membership rules have been investigated in the STACO framework by 
Finus et al. (2005), and we will also investigate the impact of open membership, where 
condition (4b) does not apply, in the sensitivity analysis. 
2.2. The STACO model  
In this section, we present the main issues in the numerical specification of our model, 
following Finus et al. (2006) and Nagashima et al. (2006). We consider twelve world regions: 
USA (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union - 15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), 
Eastern European countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries 
(EEX), China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest 
of the world (ROW). Payoffs from abatement are given as the net present value of benefits 
minus abatement costs over the model horizon. We set the model horizon to infinity to 
capture future benefits from abatement, while adopting a planning horizon for abatement and 
coalition formation of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110. Calibration of the regional BAU 
emission paths1, represented in Appendix (Figure A1), is based on the data for CO2 emission 
derived from the EPPA model (Babiker et al., 2001; Reilly, 2005) and the GDP path is also 
derived from the EPPA model. Our benefit function is based on avoided damages, calculated 
using the damage module of the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1994) and the climate module by 
Germain and Van Steenberghe (2003). For global damages, we apply the estimate by Tol 
(1997) that damages amount to 2.7 percent of GDP for a doubling of concentrations over pre-
industrial levels. Global benefits are allocated according to a fixed share for each region, as 
displayed in Appendix (Table A2). We specify an abatement cost function based on the 
estimates of the EPPA model by Ellerman and Decaux (1998). 
2.3 Technology spillovers 
Based on the ideas of technology spillovers discussed in the introduction, we identify 
technology spillovers through three major channels. In the reference scenario, we consider 
coalition formation in the absence of technology spillovers, and do not assume any 
                                                
1
 We use data from World Bank (2003) to match the regional aggregation in EPPA to STACO. 
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technological progress. In the second scenario, we assume global spillovers, which mimics 
international spillovers of knowledge generated by ‘the stock of world knowledge’ as in 
Buonanno et al. (2003), although our model is much simpler and thus cannot capture the 
knowledge creation aspect; we rather focus on the link between technology spillovers and 
incentives to cooperate in an IEA. In this context, the essence of the global spillovers is that 
every region obtains technology spillovers, irrespective of membership of the coalition or not. 
In the third scenario, in addition to the global spillovers, signatories to the climate agreement 
gain spillovers from the other coalition members (cf. the ‘coalition information exchange 
parameter’ in Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997); this scenario also refers to the mechanism in 
Kemfert (2004) that participants cooperate on technological innovation. In the fourth 
scenario, following Golombek and Hoel (2005), we consider all possible technology 
spillovers, i.e., we extend the mechanism of the third scenario with spillovers to singletons.  
In our model setting, the size of the technology spillover depends on which regions are 
member of the coalition. We assume that the spillovers will be higher when more regions are 
member of the coalition, and when regions with an advanced “state of technology” are 
member of the coalition. The “state of technology (SoT)” is expressed as the inverse of the 
regional emission intensity in the reference path, calculated as the Business-as-Usual amount 
of CO2 emission per unit of GDP.2 The rationale of this definition is that regions that have a 
low emission intensity have a high level of knowledge on GHG abatement strategies. To 
investigate the robustness of this definition of the state of technology, we introduce some 
alternative definitions in the next section. As we use the state of technology as an indicator for 
the level of knowledge, we refer to the emission intensity in the reference path and do not 
adjust for changes in the emission intensity due to abatement. This is because we feel that 
abatement primarily reflects a movement along the technology curve, i.e. adoption of existing 
knowledge, rather than a shift of the curve, i.e. creation of new knowledge. Figure 1 shows 
the state of technology. We see that throughout the century, Japan has the highest state of 
technology, followed by EU15. On the other hand, the U.S.A. and China have relatively low 
states of technology.  
                                                
2
 We scale the SoTs such that global SoT equals 1 in 2110. 
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Figure 1: State of Technology based on emission intensity 
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with 0 , , 1global C NCξ ξ ξ≤ <  where cξ  is coefficient of internal spillovers to coalition members, 
NCξ is coefficient of spillovers from coalition members to non-coalition members and globalξ is 
coefficient of global spillovers. Unfortunately, there is no strong empirical base to calibrate 
the values of the different ξ . Therefore, we conduct a robustness analysis by changing the 
values of the spillover coefficient between coalition members ( Cξ ) in Section 4. 
In the different scenarios, some ξ  are set to zero to reflect the absence of the corresponding 
spillover effect. Scenario 1 assumes no technology spillovers among regions: 
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0global C NCξ ξ ξ= = = . For Scenario 2, we assume that every region can benefit from global 
spillovers, irrespective of the coalition membership, which lead to technological progress 
slowly increasing over the century to 1% per annum, that is, globalξ  equals 0.01 and ,C NCξ ξ  
are zero in equations 5 and 6. In Scenario 3, with internal coalitional spillovers, in addition to 
global spillovers, signatories can obtain spillovers from other signatories, that is, Cξ =0.005 
and still globalξ =0.01. This scenario is expected to provide a stimulus for regions to join a 
coalition, as membership brings technology benefits, although the effect is assumed to be 
moderate, as it is on top of the global spillover effect. In Scenario 4, not only signatories 
benefit from internal coalition spillovers, but also singletons can obtain spillovers from 
signatories, that is Cξ =0.005, globalξ =0.01 and NCξ =0.001. In this case, we assume that a 
region can also benefit from its own contribution to the coalitional spillovers not as in the case 
of internal coalitional spillovers, and also outsiders can get some ratio of spillovers from the 
coalition. Following Carraro and Siniscalco (1997), we assume that the diffusion rate among 
coalitions is larger than the one towards outsiders.   
In our base model, we adopt the most common assumption on the impact of spillovers and 
assume that technology spillovers reduce marginal abatement costs over time through a 
pivoting of the MAC curve: 
 tititi MACMAC ,,1, )1( ⋅−=+ ς         (7) 
where  
 ( ) ( )1 12
,
2011 2011
α 1 β 1
t t
it
i t i is it i is it
s sit
cMAC q q
q
ς ς
− −
= =
∂    
≡ = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅   ∂    ∏ ∏    (8) 
3. Results 
As we cannot properly estimate the values of the different ξ , our analysis of the results 
focuses on the impact of spillovers on stability of partial climate coalitions, and a comparison 
of different specifications, rather than on the detailed numerical outcomes. Nonetheless, it is 
instructive to start with an analysis of the results of our base model and examine stability for 
all 4084 coalition structures. 
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Table 1: Global NPV of payoffs in the stable coalitions under four scenarios 
Coalitions Global net present value of payoffs (in billion US$) 
 
No  
spillovers 
Global 
spillovers 
Internal coalitional 
spillovers 
Extended coalitional 
spillovers 
[USA-CHN] 6705 7560 7584 7590 
[EU15-CHN] 6675 7528 7565 7574 
[CHN-ROW] 5499 6223 6236 6241 
[FSU-CHN] 5492 6214 6218 6221 
[EU15-EET-IND] 5411 6118 6133 6146 
[EU15-ROW] 4978 5638 5648 X 
[EU15-FSU] 4968 5626 5633 5644 
[JPN-IND] 4943 5602 5612 5628 
[JPN-ROW] 4858 5507 5517 X 
[JPN-FSU] 4851 5498 5507 X 
[EU15-EET] 4826 5469 5473 5485 
[JPN-EET] 4771 5409 5414 5430 
[EEX-DAE] 4630 5259 5261 5271 
[JPN-EU15-DAE] X X 5847 5876 
X denotes instability of a coalition 
Table 1 shows stable coalitions in all scenarios of technology spillovers and associated global 
net present value of payoffs in billion dollars. We obtain 13 stable coalitions in the cases of no 
spillovers and global spillovers. Global spillovers do not affect the set of stable coalitions 
because with global spillovers every region gets the same rate of technological spillovers, 
irrespective of coalition membership. Thus, while marginal abatement costs are lower and 
payoffs are higher in presence of the spillovers, the incentives to join or leave a coalition are 
not significantly influenced. The best performing coalition, in terms of global payoff, is 
formed by the USA and China: both regions have relatively flat marginal abatement cost 
curves and can thus abate substantially at relatively low cost. The high benefits accruing to 
the USA stimulate coalitional abatement, and China can obtain transfers from the USA by 
selling emission permits. Thus, these two coalition members nicely complement each other. 
Nagashima et al. (2006) show that a coalition between the USA and China is internally stable 
but externally unstable under open membership and in absence of spillovers, because Japan 
has a strong incentive to join the coalition. This accession is blocked, however, under 
exclusive membership.   
Under the internal and extended coalitional spillovers, we have 14  and 11 stable coalitions, 
respectively. In the coalitional spillover scenarios, Japan and EU15 that have relatively high 
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states of technology become attractive members of a coalition, as they generate large 
spillovers to other members; without spillovers, their steep marginal abatement cost curves 
and high damages form a substantial barrier for cooperation. A new stable coalition between 
Japan, EU15 and dynamic Asian economies emerges: in the case of coalitional spillovers, 
Japan and the EU15 can benefit from each other through high technological spillovers, 
thereby reducing the marginal abatement costs for the other coalition members. This 
overcomes the incentive for Japan to leave the coalition in absence of coalition spillovers, and 
demonstrates the use of coalition spillovers as a stabilising factor. 
Moreover, three stable coalitions under no spillovers and global spillovers, namely {Japan 
and FSU}, {Japan and ROW}, and {EU15 and ROW}, become externally unstable under the 
extended coalitional spillovers. For example, in the coalition between Japan and FSU, and the 
coalition between Japan and ROW, singleton EU15 has an incentive to join the coalition as it 
can benefit from the coalitional spillovers. Furthermore, in these three coalitions, China and 
India have incentives to enter. The entry of China or India will shift a large part of the 
financial transfers away from the FSU or ROW, since China and India have lower marginal 
abatement costs. The relatively high State of Technology in the EU15, and the low marginal 
abatement costs in China and India, make them attractive partners in this setting, and thus 
their entry is not blocked by the existing members; this makes the smaller coalition externally 
unstable. 
Clearly, the larger the spillovers are, the higher the net present value of global payoffs. Thus, 
global spillovers lead to higher payoffs than no spillover for any given coalition structure. 
Internal and extended coalitional spillovers further improve payoffs by reducing marginal 
abatement costs. In all of the stable coalitions, the highest global net present value of payoffs 
are achieved in the case of extended coalition spillovers since singletons can benefit from the 
spillovers generated by the coalition members; this boosts payoffs but may reduce incentives 
to join the coalition (though in our setting, these incentives are not changed sufficiently to 
alter the set of stable coalitions). For these four scenarios, we can conclude that only 
relatively small stable coalitions emerge, that achieve only small reductions in the stock of 
CO2. Apparently, the spillovers are not strong enough to stabilise larger and more ambitious 
coalitions. 
Next, we evaluate the impact of the technology spillovers on regional abatement levels. Table 
2 show the stock of CO2 and the optimal abatement levels in 2050 as percentage of BAU 
emissions for the All Singletons and top five stable coalitions (according to the global net 
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present value of payoffs) in the four scenarios. The result for the All Singletons case is given 
as a reference, and provides good insight into the features of the heterogeneous regions where 
abatement levels vary widely between regions, indicating widely varying marginal benefits 
and marginal abatement costs. Without spillovers, the global stock of CO2 in the All 
Singletons case is about 1,456 GtC by the year 2110, which is about 1.7 times the stock level 
in 2010. With spillovers, the global stock of CO2 in the All Singletons case slightly decreases 
to 1,449 GtC by the year 2110, as we assume that at least global spillovers are available in the 
All Singletons case. Note that as there is no coalition, all three spillover scenarios are 
identical in the All Singletons case. 
Table 2: Stock of CO2 and abatement level in the All Singletons and top five Stable 
     coalitions under four scenarios 
  
CO2 
Stock Abatement in 2050 (% of BAU emissions) 
  
In 2110 
(GtC) USA JPN EU15 OOE EET FSU EEX CHN IND DAE BRA ROW 
Without spillovers 
             
All Singletons 1456.2 6.48 2.24 5.40 3.05 2.69 4.61 1.43 7.78 4.86 1.41 0.10 4.08 
1. No spillovers                          
USA - CHN 1436.3 7.44 2.24 5.40 3.05 2.69 4.61 1.43 21.31 4.86 1.41 0.10 4.08 
EU15 - CHN 1436.6 6.48 2.24 6.24 3.05 2.69 4.61 1.43 21.74 4.86 1.41 0.10 4.08 
CHN - ROW 1448.0 6.48 2.24 5.40 3.05 2.69 4.61 1.43 12.90 4.86 1.41 0.10 6.08 
FSU - CHN 1448.1 6.48 2.24 5.40 3.05 2.69 6.41 1.43 12.87 4.86 1.41 0.10 4.08 
EU15 - EET - IND 1448.3 6.48 2.24 6.26 3.05 15.08 4.61 1.43 7.78 14.70 1.41 0.10 4.08 
 
             
With spillovers              
All Singletons 1448.9 7.04 2.56 5.91 3.28 2.94 4.96 1.63 8.62 5.35 1.61 0.11 4.47 
2. Global spillovers                          
USA - CHN 1425.7 8.07 2.56 5.91 3.28 2.94 4.96 1.63 23.25 5.35 1.61 0.11 4.47 
EU15 - CHN 1426.0 7.04 2.56 6.82 3.28 2.94 4.96 1.63 23.72 5.35 1.61 0.11 4.47 
CHN - ROW 1439.3 7.04 2.56 5.91 3.28 2.94 4.96 1.63 14.18 5.35 1.61 0.11 6.63 
FSU - CHN 1439.4 7.04 2.56 5.91 3.28 2.94 6.90 1.63 14.14 5.35 1.61 0.11 4.47 
EU15 - EET - IND 1439.7 7.04 2.56 6.83 3.28 16.26 4.96 1.63 8.62 15.98 1.61 0.11 4.47 
 
             
3. Internal spillovers                          
USA - CHN 1425.4 8.08 2.56 5.91 3.28 2.94 4.96 1.63 23.35 5.35 1.61 0.11 4.47 
EU15 - CHN 1425.5 7.04 2.56 6.83 3.28 2.94 4.96 1.63 23.88 5.35 1.61 0.11 4.47 
CHN - ROW 1439.2 7.04 2.56 5.91 3.28 2.94 4.96 1.63 14.23 5.35 1.61 0.11 6.64 
FSU - CHN 1439.4 7.04 2.56 5.91 3.28 2.94 6.90 1.63 14.16 5.35 1.61 0.11 4.47 
EU15 - EET - IND 1439.5 7.04 2.56 6.85 3.28 16.37 4.96 1.63 8.62 16.09 1.61 0.11 4.47 
              
4. Extended spillovers                          
USA - CHN 1425.3 8.09 2.56 5.92 3.29 2.94 4.97 1.63 23.36 5.36 1.61 0.11 4.48 
EU15 - CHN 1425.4 7.05 2.56 6.84 3.29 2.94 4.97 1.63 23.88 5.36 1.61 0.11 4.48 
CHN - ROW 1439.1 7.04 2.56 5.92 3.28 2.94 4.96 1.63 14.23 5.36 1.61 0.11 6.64 
FSU - CHN 1439.3 7.04 2.56 5.92 3.28 2.94 6.90 1.63 14.16 5.35 1.61 0.11 4.48 
EU15 - EET - IND 1439.3 7.05 2.56 6.86 3.29 16.38 4.97 1.63 8.64 16.10 1.62 0.11 4.48 
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For each stable coalition, we observe that singletons are hardly affected by the spillovers. This 
is not surprising, as these are only linked to the coalition members indirectly through the 
benefits of global abatement; the exception is the scenario with extended coalitional spillovers, 
where the coalition affects marginal abatement costs of the singletons. In Table 2, it is clear 
that this latter effect is quite limited: it is only noticeable for regions EET, China and India 
who have higher optimal abatement levels in scenario 4 than in scenario 2. For coalition 
members, the joint welfare maximisation of the coalition implies that their abatement levels 
are substantially higher than when they act as singleton (although the highest abatement 
percentages are not necessarily obtained by coalition members). Coalitional spillovers further 
increase their abatement percentages by lowering marginal abatement costs. Regions such as 
China or India will contribute substantially to coalitional abatement, and receive transfers by 
selling their excess emission permits to their coalition partners. 
Table 3: Incentive to change membership in the top five Stable coalitions  
  
USA JPN EU15 OOE EET FSU EEX CHN IND DAE BRA ROW 
Without spillovers                         
1. No spillovers                         
USA - CHN -106 76 -18 -107 -31 -144 -131 -205 -34 -78 -59 -133 
EU15 - CHN -560 -21 -246 -150 -53 -217 -174 -86 -88 -109 -74 -204 
CHN - ROW -31 178 170 -42 -16 -47 -56 -35 -12 -35 -22 -3 
FSU - CHN -25 179 174 -41 -16 -2 -55 -35 -11 -34 -22 -42 
EU15 - EET - IND -171 -30 -51 -56 -4 -66 -74 113 -32 -41 -43 -63 
 
            
With spillovers             
2. Global spillovers                         
USA - CHN -107 87 -22 -124 -35 -161 -144 -239 -40 -85 -66 -148 
EU15 - CHN -643 -23 -268 -173 -62 -245 -193 -101 -103 -121 -83 -231 
CHN - ROW -49 197 182 -49 -19 -54 -62 -41 -15 -39 -25 -2 
FSU - CHN -42 198 188 -49 -19 -1 -62 -41 -14 -38 -25 -49 
EU15 - EET - IND -195 -30 -57 -65 -3 -73 -80 137 -35 -42 -48 -70 
             
3. Internal spillovers                         
USA - CHN -109 101 -11 -124 -35 -161 -144 -242 -39 -85 -66 -148 
EU15 - CHN -646 -12 -273 -175 -62 -247 -195 -104 -103 -122 -83 -232 
CHN - ROW -46 207 190 -49 -19 -54 -63 -42 -15 -39 -25 -2 
FSU - CHN -40 208 195 -49 -19 -1 -62 -41 -14 -38 -25 -49 
EU15 - EET - IND -193 -25 -59 -66 -4 -73 -80 141 -36 -43 -48 -70 
             
4. Extended spillovers                         
USA - CHN -110 103 -10 -124 -35 -161 -144 -243 -39 -85 -66 -148 
EU15 - CHN -646 -10 -276 -175 -62 -247 -195 -104 -103 -121 -83 -232 
CHN - ROW -46 209 192 -49 -19 -54 -63 -42 -15 -38 -25 -2 
FSU - CHN -39 210 197 -49 -19 -1 -62 -42 -14 -38 -25 -49 
EU15 - EET - IND -193 -23 -61 -66 -4 -73 -80 141 -36 -42 -48 -69 
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The incentive to change membership decision is shown in Table 3 and is calculated as a 
coalition member’s gain when leaving the coalition (while other regions stick to their 
decision) or as a singleton’s gain when joining the coalition (i.e. single deviations). We 
observe that none of the regions has an incentive to change their membership in the coalition 
of EU15 and China. For the stable coalitions of China and Rest of the World, and Former 
Soviet Union and China, some outsiders (Japan and European Union) would like to join the 
coalition in other stable coalitions, but entry of those regions is blocked under the exclusive 
membership rule. While absolute values of the incentives differ between the scenarios due to 
the differences in technology diffusion, the sign of the incentives are unchanged, and thus the 
set of stable coalition structures remains unchanged. 
 
Figure 2: Regional undiscounted payoffs in 2110 in the coalition of USA and China 
 
Figure 2 shows how the different types of technology spillovers affect regional undiscounted 
payoffs in a coalition of the USA and China. Every non signatory is better off through 
spillovers from signatories compared with the case of no spillovers or global spillovers.  
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4. Alternative specifications of technology spillovers 
To investigate the robustness of our results, we simulate various alternative specifications of 
technology spillovers, by varying the aggregation of technology, using different indicators for 
the state of technology, changing the impact of spillovers on the MAC curve and, finally, 
calculating for different values of the main spillover parameter, i.e. the coefficient of 
technology spillovers among coalition members ( Cξ ). For ease of comparison, we use the 
base model with extended spillovers as the reference case, and vary only one assumption in 
the alternative specifications. 
4.1 Alternative aggregation of technology 
In the simulations above, the assumption is made that knowledge (‘State of Technology’ in 
our terminology) can be summed over regions to identify the size of the spillovers. According 
to Sandler (2006), however, “Knowledge is the quintessential best-shot or better shot public 
good, where breakthroughs come from concentrating effort and building up research centers 
of excellence”. Therefore, we can construct an alternative spillover formulation where we 
follow Sandler’s definition and define spillovers through a best-shot aggregation of 
technology. The implication of the best-shot aggregation (Hirshleifer, 1983; Sandler, 2006) is 
that the technology spillovers depend on the maximum state of technology in a coalition, 
rather than the sum of technologies. In the field of GHG abatement technologies, the rationale 
for the best-shot aggregation is that the technologies that regions have to reduce emissions 
will have substantial (or even full) overlap with the technologies in other regions.  
Consequently, the region with the highest state of technology will not learn from others.  
In this section, we explore the effects of best-shot aggregation on the stability of coalitions 
under the internal and extended coalitional spillovers. To reflect a region’s capability of 
adopting advanced technology, we modify the spillover specification in equations (5) and (6) 
such that the spillover depends on the difference between the highest state of technology and 
the region’s own state of technology. 
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Hence, the spillovers3 can be defined as follows; 
 
{ } { }titjNjglobaltitjKjCit SoTSoTSoTSoT ,,,, )(max)(max −⋅+−⋅= ∈∈ ξξς  ,Ki ∈∀   (9) 
 
{ } { }titjNjglobaltitjKjNCit SoTSoTSoTSoT ,,,, )(max)(max −⋅+−⋅= ∈∈ ξξς  Ki ∉∀ . (10) 
Table 4: Global NPV of payoffs (billion US$) for stable coalitions under the alternative 
     specifications of technology  
Alternative 
aggregation 
Alternative state of 
technology 
Alternative effect on 
MAC Coalition Base 
case 
Best shot Energy intensity 
Carbon 
intensity 
Extend to 
right 
Change 
curvature 
[USA-CHN] 7590 7446 7594 8966 7265 6898 
[EU15-CHN] 7574 7495 7569 8939 7242 6871 
[CHN-ROW] 6241 6085 6242 7405 5934 5692 
[FSU-CHN] 6221 6044 6222 7385 5921 X 
[EU15-EET-IND] 6146 6011 6145 7297 5854 5594 
[JPN-EU15-DAE] 5876 X 5866 7001 X 5341 
[EU15-FSU] 5644 5507 5642  X 5362 5149 
[JPN-IND] 5628 5520 5626 6661 5334 5132 
[EU15-EET] 5485 5341 5483 6505 5202 5009 
[JPN-EET] 5430 5308 5428 6431 5144 4956 
[EEX-DAE] 5271 5104 5268  X 4976 X 
[JPN-FSU] X 5413 X X 5235 X 
[JPN-ROW] X 5403 X X X 5047 
[JPN-EU15-ROW] X X X 7201 X X 
[JPN-EU15-FSU] X X X 7173 X X 
[JPN-OOE] X X X 6384 X X 
[EU15-ROW] X X X X 5373 X 
Note: Base case indicates the case of extended coalitional spillovers. X denotes instability 
of the coalition.  
Table 4 shows the global net present value (NPV) of payoffs with the best-shot technology 
aggregation (assuming extended coalitional spillovers). For each coalition, payoffs are 
somewhat lower than in the base case, because the spillovers are smaller (compare equations 
9 and 10 with 5 and 6). In contrast to the base model specification, the highest global NPV of 
payoffs is obtained in the coalition between EU15 and China. The result suggests that as 
                                                
3
 All spillover coefficients are unchanged, and in the best-shot aggregation, we rescale the SoTs such that the 
maximum SoT equals 1 in 2110. 
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China can learn more from the EU15 than from USA, cooperation with the EU15 is now more 
successful (in terms of global abatement levels) than with the USA. We get twelve stable 
coalitions where the ten stable coalitions are the same as in the base case of extended 
coalitional spillovers, but the new coalitions Japan & FSU, and Japan & ROW emerge, while 
the coalition Japan & EU15 & DAE is not stable anymore. The results suggest that the best-
shot technology induces participation if the partner is the highest state of technology holder, 
Japan. But the main conclusion is that the aggregation method does not change the qualitative 
outcomes of the analysis. 
4.2 Alternative indicators for state of technology 
In this section, we consider alternative indicators for state of technology, using energy4 
intensity or carbon intensity instead of emission intensity. Energy intensity is calculated as 
energy use per unit of GDP, whereas carbon intensity is calculated as the amount of CO2 
emitted per unit of energy. Emission intensity is used among others by Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1997), while Kemfert (2004) uses energy intensity. Table 4 also shows the stable coalitions 
with these alternative indicators of state of technology. With the state of technology based on 
energy intensity, we obtain the same stable coalitions as in the base case. This is because the 
regional trends of energy intensity are similar to the trends of the emissions-output ratio. In 
contrast, with the state of technology based on carbon intensity, some of the stable coalitions 
are the same but additionally different stable coalitions emerge. In our model, emission-output 
ratios and energy intensities decrease over time, but this is not the case for carbon intensity. 
This shows that while emission intensity and energy intensity are more or less 
interchangeable as indicator of the state of technology in addressing climate change, carbon 
intensity is a relatively poor indicator because of the missing link to economic activity, and 
using it may lead to misleading conclusions. 
4.3 Alternative effects of spillovers on the MAC curve 
The effect of technology spillovers and learning on the shape of the marginal abatement cost 
(MAC) curve is hardly ever subjected to a thorough analysis, even though suspicion of the 
effect of technical change on marginal abatement costs was already put forward more than 20 
years ago by Downing and White (1986). Recently, two papers emerged, Baker et al. (2007) 
                                                
4
 The trajectory of the final energy is based on EPPA model (Reilly, 2005). 
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and Bauman et al. (2007), that challenge the conventional assumption that technical change 
will pivot the MAC curve down. Bauman et al. (2007) takes up the argumentation of 
Downing and White (1986) and show that in certain circumstances technical change may 
even increase marginal abatement costs. Baker et al. (2007) review the literature and derive 
that different technology options will have a different impact on marginal abatement costs. 
Following Baker et al. (2007), we adopt two alternatives to our base model: (i) technology 
spillovers will extend the MAC curve to the right, and (ii) technology spillovers will affect the 
curvature of the MAC curve.  
In model terms, this implies that we separate the effects of the spillovers on the two parts of 
our MAC function (eq. (8) in Section 2.3). In the base case, a spillover will reduce both 
parameters α and β. We approximate an extension of the curve to the right as a spillover 
effect that will only affect parameter α (to the same extent as in the base model), leaving 
parameter β unchanged. This implies that the initial slope of the MAC curve is unchanged, 
but the curvature is reduced. In the alternative with a changed curvature, we assume that 
technology spillovers will reduce the initial slope of the MAC curve, but increase the 
curvature (where we assume the effect is smaller but not insignificant). In mathematical 
notation, we have: 
Base model:  ( ) ( )1 12
,
2011 2011
α 1 β 1
t t
it
i t i is it i is it
s sit
cMAC q q
q
ς ς
− −
= =
∂    
≡ = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅   ∂    ∏ ∏  (8) 
Extension:  ( )1 2
,
2011
α 1 β
t
it
i t i is it i it
sit
cMAC q q
q
ς
−
=
∂  
≡ = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ∂  ∏    (11) 
Change curvature: ( ) ( )1 12
,
2011 2011
α 1 0.1 β 1
t t
it
i t i is it i is it
s sit
cMAC q q
q
ς ς
− −
= =
∂    
≡ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅   ∂    ∏ ∏  (12) 
The main results of these alternative specifications can be found in the last two columns of 
Table 4. We observe that largely, the same stable coalitions emerge. In the alternative 
specifications the total spillover effect is somewhat smaller than in the base model (as the 
effect on β is missing, and the effect on α is reversed, respectively), but this does not affect 
stability of the coalitions substantially. In the first alternative, with extension of the MAC 
curve to the right, two new stable coalitions emerge (Japan & FSU and EU15 & ROW, 
respectively) and one stable coalition from the base model turns unstable (Japan & EU15 & 
DAE). Similarly, the second alternative (changing curvature) leads to one additional stable 
coalition (Japan & ROW) and the instability of FSU & China and EEX & DAE. The three 
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best-performing stable coalitions are unaffected, however. Thus, we conclude that while the 
impact of the technology spillover cannot be ignored, the qualitative conclusions still hold. 
4.4 Alternative levels of spillovers between coalition members ( Cξ ) 
We suspect that larger technology spillovers among signatories, by increasing the coefficient 
of intra-coalitional technology spillovers, may enhance larger stable coalitions. The larger 
spillovers induce signatories to stay in the coalition, and thus additional internally stable 
coalitions are expected to emerge. The large coalitional spillovers attract potential new 
entrants because coalition members can get higher benefits from increased abatement by 
reducing emissions at lower costs than in the base model.  
We examine stability of all coalitions using different values of coalitional spillovers, moving 
from 0.005 to 0.05 in ten steps. The results of these calculations are summarized in Figure 3, 
which shows the net present value of global payoffs for all stable coalitions. 
Figure 3: Global NPV of payoffs (billion US$) for all stable coalitions with different  
     values of coalitional spillovers 
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As expected, global payoffs rise with increasing spillovers, as can be seen from the coalition 
of USA and China, which is stable for all values of spillovers that we specified. This coalition 
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has only two members, but outperforms all other stable coalitions in terms of global 
abatement levels and payoffs. The reason is that these two regions both have very flat MAC 
curves and thus can abate more than other coalitions at low costs. As the damage estimate for 
the USA is rather large, a transfer scheme will induce that the USA is willing to finance some 
of the abatement in China. These two regions will block entrance of other regions that would 
like to join (for instance Japan or the EU15), as entrance of these new members would 
increase abatement efforts in the USA and China too much and disturb stability. 
It appears that while larger coalitional spillovers do enhance stability, stable coalitions always 
consist of relatively few regions, one or two with a relatively high state of technology and 
high marginal costs /benefits (e.g., Japan and/or EU15), and one or two regions with a high 
state of technology and moderate marginal costs/low marginal benefits (e.g., FSU and/or 
DAE). For instance, for values of Cξ  up to 0.03 the coalition of Japan and EET is stable (and 
has very modest ambitions in terms of abatement levels), but for higher spillovers, the EU15 
will successfully join these two regions to form a more ambitious stable coalition: the rather 
high level of technology in the EU15 makes it an attractive partner when the spillovers 
generated by this coalition are large enough.  
The entry of regions with lower abatement costs, such as China, can be blocked by some of 
the coalition members because the entry decreases the payoffs for regions with moderate 
marginal costs/low marginal benefits, which makes the coalition externally stable. It should 
be noted however that this grouping of regions may be affected by the type of transfer 
mechanism adopted in the model (emission permits; as Nagashima et al., 2006, show, the type 
of transfer scheme does not affect the major qualitative conclusions, but does matter for 
which regions will successfully form a coalition). The conclusion can be drawn that larger 
coalitional spillovers may enlarge the coalition, but the effect is rather small and the most 
effective coalition is not affected at all by the level of spillovers. 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine how the main assumptions affect model results. 
We check stability of all coalitions using the open membership rule. In addition, as we believe 
that a crucial parameter in the model is the discount rate r , and this is subjected to a 
sensitivity analysis as well.  
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Table 5: Results of the sensitivity analysis 
Alternative 
membership rule 
Higher discount 
rate 
Lower discount 
rate 
Coalition Base 
case Open 
membership 
3% instead of 2 % 1% instead of 2 % 
[JPN-EET] O X O O 
[EU15-EET] O X O X 
[EU15-FSU] O X O X 
[USA-CHN] O X O O 
[EU15-CHN] O O O O 
[FSU-CHN] O X O X 
[JPN-IND] O O O O 
[EU15-EET-IND] O X O O 
[JPN-EU15-DAE] O X X O 
[EEX-DAE] O X O X 
[CHN-ROW] O X O X 
[[JPN-FSU] X X O X 
[EU15-ROW] X X O X 
[JPN-OOE] X X X O 
[OOE-EET] X X X O 
[JPN-EU15-FSU] X X X O 
[USA-EET-IND] X X X O 
[JPN-ROW] X X X O 
Note: “O” indicates a stable coalition; X denotes instability of the coalition. 
As in Section 4, we refer to the scenario with state of technology based on emission-output 
ratio, summation of technology over regions, a pivoting effect of spillovers on the MAC 
curve, exclusive membership and the case of extended coalitional spillovers (with 
0.005Cξ = ) as the base case. Table 5 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis for the 
base case and the alternative specifications. 
First, we assume an open membership rule where non-signatories can join the coalition freely 
whenever they can obtain a higher payoff by joining the coalition, without the approval by 
other signatories (d’Aspremont et al., 1983).5 Under the open membership rule, only two 
stable coalitions, EU15 & China and Japan & India emerge. These results imply that, in line 
with previous studies (Finus et al., 2005), stability is sensitive to the membership rule and 
exclusive membership enhances stability but cannot make large coalitions stable.  
                                                
5
 Formally, the stability concept under open membership is defined as: 
Internal stability: {})\()( iKVKV ii ≥  ,Ki ∈∀  External stability: { })()( jKVKV jj ∪≥  Kj ∉∀ . 
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Secondly, we change the base value of discount rate r  from 2 % to 3% and 1%, respectively, 
reflecting a higher (lower) rate of time preference. Changing the value of r  will decrease 
(increase) the amount of abatement and global net present value of payoffs as future benefits 
from abatement are valued lower (higher) , but the set of stable coalitions remains largely the 
same as the base case. 
6. Discussions and conclusions 
In this paper, we explore the effects of the technology spillovers among heterogeneous 
regions on the stability of possible climate coalitions under permit trading and the exclusive 
membership rules. We identify technology spillovers through three major channels, and 
investigate how technology spillovers can influence the region’s incentive structure to join the 
coalition. Compared with the case of no spillovers, global spillovers can generate higher 
payoffs and global abatement levels, but global spillovers do not increase stability. 
By and large, the technology spillovers to the coalitional members increase their incentive to 
stay in the coalition and their efforts to reduce emissions, which leads to larger global payoffs 
and lower global CO2 stock. Moreover, Japan and EU15, with relatively high states of 
technology, are likely to be members of coalitions because other coalitional members are 
willing to form the coalition with them to receive the high technology spillovers. On the other 
hand, the spillovers to outsiders will not significantly influence the incentive to free-ride for 
outsiders, and thus the set of stable coalitions remains unchanged. To what extent coalitional 
spillovers will stabilise larger coalitions remains a question for empirical analysis: the 
stronger the spillovers, the larger the stable coalitions. But the analysis in this paper shows 
that spillovers between coalition members need to be extremely high to overcome the strong 
free rider incentives that prevail in the international climate negotiations. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Global parameters 
Symbol Description Value Unit Source 
 
M  
 
Pre-industrial level of 
CO2 stock 
590 GtC Nordhaus (1994) 
δ  
natural annual removal 
rate of CO2 stock 
0.00866 - Nordhaus (1994) 
ω  
airborne fraction of 
emissions remaining in 
the atmosphere 
0.64 - Nordhaus (1994) 
r  discount rate 0.02 - assumption 
iθ  
share of region i in 
global benefits 
see Table A2,  
column 3 
own calculation based on Fankhauser 
(1995)  
iα  
abatement cost 
parameter of region i 
see Table A2, 
 column 4 
own calculation based on Ellerman 
and Decaux (1998) 
iβ  
abatement cost 
parameter of region i 
see Table A2,  
column 5 
own calculation based on Ellerman and 
Decaux (1998) 
Dγ  
scale parameter of 
damage and benefit 
function 
0.027 - Tol (1997) 
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Table A2: Regional parameters in the benefit and abatement cost function 
Regions 
Emission in 
2010 
Share of global 
benefits  
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
 GtC (share)    
USA 1.763 (0.238) 0.226 0.0005 0.0398 
JPN 0.344 (0.046) 0.173 0.0155 1.8160 
EU15 0.943 (0.127) 0.236 0.0024 0.1503 
OOE 0.360 (0.049) 0.035 0.0083 0 
EET 0.226 (0.030) 0.013 0.0079 0.0486 
FSU 0.774 (0.104) 0.068 0.0023 0.0042 
EEX 0.469 (0.063) 0.030 0.0032 0.3029 
CHN 1.127 (0.152) 0.062 0.00007 0.0239 
IND 0.344 (0.046) 0.050 0.0015 0.0787 
DAE 0.316 (0.043) 0.025 0.0047 0.3774 
BRA 0.122 (0.016) 0.015 0.5612 8.4974 
ROW 0.637 (0.086) 0.068 0.0021 0.0805 
World 7.425 ( )1=∑  ( )θ 1i =∑  
    
 
iα iβiθ
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Figure A1: Regional BAU emission paths 
 
Source: own calculations based on projections from the MIT-EPPA model (Reilly, 2005). 
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